Abstract. Although traditional asymmetric algorithm along with its implementations are successful in keeping important documents confidential, it uses only one private key. This research proposes the loose asymmetric (LA) algorithm to satisfy requirement of generating many access keys. Each access key is granted to only one user. This demand is real because a group of members needs to retrieve same documents but each member requires confidentiality in access. Because implementation of LA algorithm is complicated, I also propose two schemes of how to deploy LA algorithm. The research is a proposal because I do not make experiment on LA algorithm yet.
Introduction
In theory of cryptography, asymmetric algorithm indicates an encryption technique in which there are two keys such as public key and private key. The sender uses public key to encrypt a document and the receiver uses private key to decrypt the encrypted document. The popular implementation of asymmetric algorithm is RSA scheme [1, pp. 285-287] . Please read the book "Handbook of Applied Cryptography" by authors [1, pp. 283-319] for more details about asymmetric algorithm. Asymmetric algorithm is based on Fermat's theorem [2, pp. 70-72] , [1, pp. 286-287] .
Although traditional asymmetric algorithm along with its implementations are successful in keeping important documents confidential, it uses only one private key. In other words, private key is distributed to only one person or one group. In some situations, it is required to generate many private keys and each private key is granted to one user. This research proposes a so-called loose asymmetric (LA) algorithm to satisfy this requirement. The demand is real because a group of members needs to retrieve same documents but each member requires confidentiality in access. Moreover, it is possible to keep track access log for restricting access attack. LA algorithm is based on theory of linear algebra. It is "loose" because many generated private keys can be revealed. In other words, it is less restricted than traditional asymmetric algorithm with only one private key. Generated private keys in LA algorithm are called access keys. The next section "LA Algorithm" is description of LA algorithm. Consequently, section "Schemes of LA Algorithm" describes two schemes of how to implement LA algorithm. I do not deploy such scheme yet and so I will build up the software that deploys it in the future. Final section is the discussion.
LA Algorithm
Some keys in the loose asymmetric (LA) algorithm are column vectors. Suppose we have vector Z. Let v(Z) be the mapping from Z to an integer, which is sum of all elements of Z, as seen in Eq. 1.
The mapping v(Z) is called value of Z, which is linear due to:
( + ) = ( 1 + 1 ) + ( 2 + 2 ) + ⋯ + ( + ) = ( ) + ( ) Where α, β are scalar values and X, Y are vectors. There are three confidential levels for keys in LA algorithm. For instance, Z is private key if it is known by only one person, which is totally secret. Z is semi-public key if the number of persons who know it is more than 1 but limited. Z is public key if the number of persons who know it is unlimited, which is totally public.
As a convention, numbers in this research are integers by default. Uppercase letter Z indicates vector Z and bit string of Z, which is dependent on context. Uppercase letter also denotes matrix. Lowercase letter q denotes an integer q. Notation gcd(a, b) denotes greatest common divisor of a and b. Notations s, s', and s'' denote original document (plaintext), firstly encrypted document, and secondly encrypted document, respectively. These documents are represented as integers with note that gcd(s, η) = 1 where η is large positive integer used for modulo operators. Given integer division s = qη + r, we denote = ⌊ ⁄ ⌋ and r = s%η.
Let g denote both power s n and root √ (if such root exists) where n ≥ 0. Let r be residual of g and η such that g = qη + r. Let r -1 be modulo inverse of r such that r -1 r ≡ 1 (mod η). Let sign "↔" denote mathematical equivalence. I prove the important property "gcd( 
We have gcd(s', η) = 1 due to gcd(s, η) = 1. In practice, E and D are inversely generated from hint of their values v(E) and v(D). Let M be singular matrix of size n, which means that M has n columns and rank of M is m which is smaller than n (m < n). M is called mask matrix. Let X be access key in LA algorithm, which is deliver to user, as seen in Eq. 3.
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X is a solution of Eq. 4 as follows:
= (4) Due to m < n, the number of independent variables x i of X is k = n -m. The number k is known as dimension of solution space. Let X be set of solutions X (s). Therefore, the equation above has many solutions X (s). Without loss of generality, let x m+1 , x m+2 ,…, x n be independent variables and each solution X has general form, as seen in Eq. 5.
The decryption key D is not stored and it is vanished after the set X is determined. There are m = n-k linear functions f i (s) and each of them has k variables. They are called retrieval functions, which are lines or hyper-planes. The set F = {f 1 , f 2 ,…, f m } is called retrieval function set. Retrieval function is main point of LA algorithm. The set χ = {x m+1 , x m+2 ,…, x n } is called independent set. I refer to the book "Linear Algebra" [1, pp. 113-145] for understanding the solution space of linear equation system.
If some constraints are established, the number of solutions is finite and cardinality of set X is determined. X is called access key set, which is delivered restrictedly to a finite group of trusted users who are granted access right to secured document. Users mentioned in this research are trusted users by default. We only focus on the finite X. As a convention, the number of users is |X| which is the cardinality of set X. When each user is granted an access key X belonging to X, LA algorithm will retrieve the decryption key D from the formula D = MX. Fig. 1 shows a simplest flow chart of LA algorithm. Attackers can find out linear retrieval function f i by recurrence technique if X is leaked partially or totally. For example, if k = 2 and attackers know 2 access keys X 1 and X 2 in X, it is easy for them to know a unique line f i through two points X 1 and X 2 . The simplest solution is to establish that the dimension of solution space k is always larger than the number of users.
> | | For explanation, given k=3 and |X| = 2 it is difficult to determine exactly a hyper-plane f i through only 2 points (2 access keys).
Schemes of LA Algorithm
There may exist many schemes of LA algorithm and thus I propose two schemes in this section. Suppose data pool S stores s' encrypted by key E. Each user is granted an access key ∈ . All users are also delivered the same mask matrix M. When they received s', they decrypt s' into s by key D = MX. Mask matrix M is shared with more than one person, which may cause M to be revealed but revealing M is meaningless because attackers do not know X. However a serious problem is raised because a user easily retrieves key D by matrix multiplication MX and so other access keys are meaningless. The solution is to build trusted center C that stores M in secret. The mask matrix M becomes private key of C. An access protocol is established when user U requires to access s, center C will decrypt s' into s and send s to U via communication channel. However, the protocol is not totally confidential because attackers can intervene in such channel in order to catch s. I propose a standard scheme called LA scheme to improve the access protocol more secured. For convenience, I identify LA scheme with LA algorithm and I refer them as LA for short. Before explaining LA scheme shown in Figure 2 , I describes key generation process. Firstly, we generate two large primes p 1 
Note that c(X) is the number of elements of X with constraint that c(X) ≤ n. Initially, we set c(X) = n. Suppose elements x 2 , x 3 ,…, x n are not all zero, ∑ 2 ( ) =2 ≠ 0. Keys E and D are 1-element vectors and M has 1 row and n columns. As a convention, E and D are identified with e and d. The rank of M is m=1 and the dimension of solution space is k = n-1. In practice, the size of M is n = |X| + 2 at least due to k > |X|. There is only one retrieval function and its evaluation on X is 1 ( )
. It is easy to add a new user by the simple method. For instance, we generate randomly a new integer a 1(n+1) in order to extend M such that = (1 We select randomly an integer t such that 1 < t < v(D)/2 and then calculate quotient = ⌊ ( )⁄ ⌋ ≠ 1. Finally, let X' be encoded access key that is derived from X, q and t, as seen in Eq. 7.
After X' is created, X and D are destroyed and the key generation process is finished. We consider that access key X is represented by the triple (X', q, t) in which X' and q are public keys whereas t is private key. Each user is granted a unique triple (X', q, t). Key q is also called noisy key. Table 1 describes 5 steps of LA scheme shown in Figure 2 to retrieve confidential document. Table 1 . Standard scheme of LA algorithm.
1. Pool S encrypts s into s' by public key E and stores s' available to center C.
3. User U requests for s by sending his keys (q, X') to C via communication channel L 1 . 4. C creates both noisy data w and s'' from s' by keys (q, X') of U 2 and its keys M according to Eq. 8. Note that w and s'' are used for hiding s in order to prevent attackers from catching s on channel L 1 .
5. C sends both w and s'' to U via channel L 1 . Consequently, U decrypts s'' into s by w and his key t according to Eq. 9.
LA uses two keys (E, M) and |X| key triples (X', q, t). Center C and each user U are responsible for keeping M and t totally secret, respectively. Center C does not store permanently anything except M, which is a strong point of LA. This improves the security level which was decreased twice due to 1 < t < v(D)/2. LA is kept as simple as possible in order to possibly implement LA on hardware.
Because E is public key, LA scheme cannot prevent attackers from sending invalid document that is a real document whose content is readable but wrong whereas noisy data has no content. Therefore, I also propose a so-called loose asymmetric cyclic (LAC) scheme in order to prevent broadcasting invalid document. LAC scheme, which is an extension of LA scheme, allows only users to broadcast documents to other users via center C by secured manner. Pool S is not concerned, for example, C can connect some pool for permanent or temporary storage. Hence, there is a cycle "from users to center and back to users" in LAC scheme, as seen in figure 3 . For convenience, I refer LAC scheme as LAC for short. According to LAC, X is solution of Eq. 10 which is the double of Eq. 4. The additional equation NX = E has a new mask matrix N for hiding E.
As usual, I describes key the generation process of LAC firstly. Recall that we generate keys e and d according to RSA scheme [1, p. 286]. The feature expressed by Eq. 11 implies that we always achieve φ/2 ≤ d ≤ e < φ after few simple transformations.
Keys E and D are created such that v(E) = e and v(D) = d. We generate randomly n-2 integers a 13 , a 14 ,…, a 1n and n-2 integers b 13 , b 14 ,…, b 1n to create matrices M and N, respectively. Consequently, we generate randomly n-2 integers x 3 , x 4 ,…, x n to create access key X so that X is solution of both equations MX = D and NX = E, as seen in Eq. 12. 
Suppose elements x 3 , x 4 ,…, x n are not all zero. The rank of M and N is m=1 and the dimension of solution space is k = n-2 due to fixed x 1 and x 2 . In practice, the size of M is n = |X| + 3 at least due to k > |X|. There are two retrieval functions and their evaluations on X are 1 ( ) = 1 = − ∑ . Similar to LA, we select randomly an integer t such that 1 < t < v(D)/2 and then calculate two quotients = ⌊ ( )⁄ ⌋ ≠ 1 and = ⌊ ( )⁄ ⌋ ≠ 1 . The encoded access key X' is redefined according to Eq. 13. Recall that q and p are called noisy keys. After X' is created, three keys X, D, and E are destroyed and the key generation process is finished. Center C now owns two private keys M and p. Matrix N becomes public key. As usual, each user is granted a unique triple (X', q, t) in which X' and q are public keys whereas t is private key. Table 2 shows 5 steps of LAC, in which users U 1 and U 2 broadcast and retrieve confidential document, respectively. Table 2 . LAC scheme of LA algorithm.
1. User U 1 creates both noisy data x and temporal document y from s by public key N and her keys (X', t) according to Eq. 14. 3. User U 2 requests for s by sending his keys (q, X') to C via channel L 1 . 4. C creates both noisy data w and s'' from s' by keys (q, X') of U 2 and its keys M according to Eq. 8. 5. C sends both w and s'' to U 2 via channel L 1 . Consequently, U 2 decrypts s'' into s by w and his key t according to Eq. 9.
LAC prevents attackers from sending invalid document because they do not know E to encrypt invalid document but it cannot prevent attackers from broadcasting noisy data. LA uses three keys (M, N, p) and |X| key triples (X', q, t). Center C is responsible for keeping its private keys M and p totally secret. Each user is responsible for keeping her/his private key t totally secret.
In case of high security, a user needs access acceptance of all other users. In step 3 of LA, when a user U i requires to access document, center C will ask for all encoded access keys from other users. Of course, C can store all users' identities for checking the acceptance. However this solution is neither secured nor optimal because C does not store anything except mask matrices. I propose bitwise technique to solve this problem. Let "v" denote XOR bitwise operator. Suppose there are μ users U 1 , U 2 ,…, U μ such that μ < |X| < k where k is the aforementioned dimension of solution space. If the number of such users is odd, only one user owns two access keys, which does not affect security level with regard to group acceptance. Therefore, the size of M should be n = μ + 4 at least for both LA and LAC. Suppose μ is even. Notations X i ' and X' have the same meaning, which indicate encoded access keys. Let Y i be compound access key of user U i with note that Y i is XOR sequence of all encoded access keys except X i ', as seen in Eq. 16. 
Discussion
The ideology of the LA algorithm is simple, which only applies some concepts of linear algebra, but its implementation schemes shown in figures 2 and 3 are complex. Both LA scheme and LAC scheme are based on RSA scheme [1, pp. 285-287] but LAC scheme is essentially the double of LA algorithm. Therefore I make a comparison of RSA scheme and LA scheme because they are typical implementations of traditional asymmetric algorithm and LA algorithm, respectively. LA aims to solve the problem of many users who want to access same documents in confidential manner. An alternative solution for RSA is to store documents in center C and each pair of public/private keys is used for data transference via communication channel given one user. Suppose a normal integer is nonnegative and has b bits. In LA and RSA, possibly maximum integer resulted from power operators before taking modulo operator is ( ) 2 . A tip for preventing integer overflow when taking modulo operator of a large number s L is to divide L by a small enough integer p such that L = gl + r. Later on, we take two modulo operators such that ≡ 1 (mod ) and ≡ 2 (mod ). Finally, we have ≡ ( 1 ) 2 (mod ). The procedure can be recursive for (s 1 )
l if s 1 and l are large enough. Suppose encryption key e and decryption key d are normal integers. The bit-length of RSA is 2b because it has only two keys e and d. Suppose each of n-1 random elements a 12 , a 13 ,…, a 1n of M has b/(n-1) bits. Suppose each of n-1 random elements x 2 , x 3 ,…, x n of X has log 2 −1 bits at least with note that such x 2 , x 3 ,…, x n are not all zero. From Eq. 6 and Eq. 7, we have Eq. 17 to calculate the bit-length of LA with note that x 1 and 1 ′ may be negative. Therefore, LA needs more resources than RSA but the security level of a cryptography algorithm depends on its weakest private key. The weakest key of LA is t whose searching space has b-1 bits 2n-2 unknowns d, t 1 , t 2 ,…, t n-2 , a 12 , a 13 ,…, a 1n in order to determine d or some weakest key t j if they know whole X. The solution space of Eq. 18 has n dimensions and so its bit-length is 2b-1 at least because each a 1i (i ≥ 2) has b/(n-1) bits and the searching space of each t i has b-1 bits, attackers cannot do brute-force search over the solution space when b is large enough. 
RSA takes e + d -2 modulo multiplications due to two powers s' = s v(E) and s = (s')
v(D)
. Similarly, according to Table 1 , LA takes (e-1) + (q-1) + (d-qt-1) + (t-1) + 1 = e + d -3 + q + t -qt modulo multiplications for encryption, decryption, and making noisy data, which is smaller than e + d -2 due to qt ≥ q+t. Thus, LA is faster than RSA if computational resources are enough and extra cost for communication and matrix multiplication is insignificant. By compromising all factors, RSA is cheaper and more secured than LA but LA solves the aforementioned problem of multi-user confidential access better than RSA because center C does not know original documents in LA. Otherwise, C knows original documents in RSA. Moreover, LAC is more secured than RSA against factorization attack because both E and D are destroyed in LAC.
The LA needs to be implemented and experimented because this paper is the proposal. In the future I will build up a camera system for online monitoring via mobile phone with a group of authenticated users. Because video stream is dynamic data, we need to create one window W 1 at pool S (camera S), one windows W 2 at center C, and one window W 3 for each user U. Following is possible flow of the application:
1. Firstly, video stream is encrypted by S after flowing through W 1 and then it goes to W 2 . 2. It is encrypted secondly by C after flowing through W 2 and then it goes to W 3 . 3. Finally, it is decrypted and viewed by U 2 after flowing through W 3 . If users play the role of pool S, they can broadcast videos among themselves according to LAC.
